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 Abstract 
 In the first part of this article, I will briefly review research findings that show that 
professional lie catchers, such as police officers, are generally rather poor at distinguishing 
between truths and lies. I believe that there are many reasons contributing towards this poor 
ability, and will give an overview of these reasons in the second part of this article. I also 
believe that professionals could become better lie detectors and will explain how in the final 
part of this article. 
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 Invited Article: Why Professionals Fail to Catch Liars and How They Can Improve 
 When criminal justice investigators (police officers, lawyers, prosecutors, judges, 
juries, and so on) assess statements made by suspects, victims and witnesses, they are almost 
always confronted with the age old dilemma of how to distinguish between those who are 
telling the truth and those who are not (Horvath, Jayne, & Buckley, 1994). Police officers 
like to present themselves as being good lie detectors (Inbau, Reid, Buckley, & Jayne, 2001), 
but research does not really support this claim. In a typical lie detection study, professional 
lie catchers, such as police officers, CIA agents, etc., are shown videoclips from numerous 
liars and truth tellers and are asked after each clip to indicate whether the person was lying or 
telling the truth. In such a study, simply guessing would result in an accuracy rate 
(percentage of correct classifications) of 50%. Vrij and Mann (in press) reviewed ten lie 
detection studies with professional lie catchers. Three main findings emerged. The average 
total accuracy rate (i.e., accuracy scores for detecting truths and detecting lies combined) was 
rather low, 55%, and very similar to the total accuracy rate (57%) found with laypersons, 
such as college students, as observers (Vrij, 2000a). Also, although professional lie catchers 
don't seem to be better lie detectors than laypersons, they often feel more confident in their 
ability to detect truths and lies. Finally, some groups of professional lie catchers are better 
than others. For example, Ekman and O'Sullivan (1991) found that police officers (56% total 
accuracy) and polygraph examiners (56% total accuracy) obtained similar accuracy rates to 
university students (53% total accuracy), whereas members of the Secret Service were better 
at detecting lies than university students (64% total accuracy). 
 However, a limitation of most of these lie detection studies with professional lie 
catchers is that they are artificial. In those studies, police officers typically have to detect 
truths and lies told by college students for the sake of the experiment in laboratory settings 
(e.g., Ekman & O'Sullivan, 1991; Ekman, O'Sullivan, & Frank, 1999). This situation differs 
in at least three ways from detecting truths and lies in police interviews. First, the stakes 
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(positive consequences of getting away with the lie and negative consequences of being 
caught) are lower in those laboratory settings than in police interviews which may hamper lie 
detection. I return to this stakes issue below. Second, the average college student differs from 
the average suspect in a police interview. For example, college students are on average more 
intelligent that suspects in police interviews (Gudjonsson, 2003) and this difference in 
intelligence might affect the way they tell lies (Ekman & Frank, 1993). Third, college 
students in laboratory settings typically lie about different topics (for example, what their 
attitude is towards the death penalty) than suspects in police interviews. Because of these 
differences, examining police officers' ability to distinguish between truths and lies told by 
these students in laboratory settings might not be a valid test of their true ability to detect 
truths and lies. Our recent study (Mann, Vrij, & Bull, 2004) was more ecologically valid and 
therefore a better test to examine police officers' ability to detect deceit. We showed 99 police 
officers, not identified in previous research as belonging to groups which are superior in lie 
detection, videotapes consisting of 54 truths and lies told by suspects during their videotaped 
police interviews. A total accuracy rate of 65% was obtained, which was higher than 
generally found in more artificial studies. However, the accuracy rate was still far from 
perfect, and errors were frequently made. Errors are not surprising given the many difficulties 
and pitfalls in lie detection which are outlined in the next section. 
 Difficulties and Pitfalls in Lie Detection1 
1. Absence of Pinocchio's nose. Several recent reviews of deception research (Ben-Shakhar 
& Elaad, 2003; DePaulo, Lindsay, Malone, Muhlenbruck, Charlton, & Cooper, 2003; 
Kleiner, 2002; MacLaren, 2001; Masip, Sporer, Garrido, & Herrero, in press; Vrij, 2000a; in 
press, a) in which more than 150 studies regarding how liars respond were analysed, revealed 
one striking finding: There is not a single verbal, nonverbal or physiological cue uniquely 
related to deception. In other words, nothing similar to Pinocchio's growing nose actually 
exists. Obviously, this makes lie detection difficult as there is nothing the lie detector can 
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truly rely upon. The absence of giveaway cues does not imply that liars and truth tellers 
always respond in the same way. In fact, they do not. However, when liars and truth tellers 
do respond differently, this is not the result of lying per se, but the result of the liar 
experiencing at least one of the following processes: emotion, content complexity, and 
attempted control (Vrij, 2000a)2. These processes reveal signs that can be detected by a lie 
detector. Each process emphasises a different aspect of deception and deceptive responses. 
Liars may well experience all three aspects simultaneously, and the three processes should 
therefore not be considered as opposing camps. 
 With regard to emotions, Ekman (1985/2001) pointed out that liars might feel guilty 
because they are lying, might be afraid of getting caught, or might be excited about having 
the opportunity to fool someone.  
 Regarding content complexity, sometimes liars find it difficult to lie, as they have to 
think of plausible answers, avoid contradicting themselves and tell a lie that is consistent with 
everything that the observer knows or might find out, whilst avoiding making slips of the 
tongue. Moreover, they have to remember what they have said, so that they can keep their 
story consistent when asked to repeat it (Burgoon, Buller, & Guerrero, 1995; Vrij, 2000a). 
This might be more difficult than truth telling, especially when the liar has not prepared a 
story and has to concoct one instantly. Also, liars continuously have to monitor their speech 
and nonverbal behaviour in order to appear convincing throughout their lie. This probably 
becomes increasingly difficult as lies increase in length and complexity.  
 Regarding attempted control, liars may worry that engaging in deceit will increase the 
likelihood of them exhibiting cues that will give their lies away, and therefore may attempt to 
control their behaviour, suppressing such signs and engaging in impression management, that 
is, trying to make a convincing impression in order to avoid getting caught (Buller & 
Burgoon, 1996; Hocking & Leathers, 1980). However, this is not easy. Liars need to 
effectively suppress nervousness, masking evidence of having to think hard, should know 
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how they normally respond in order to make an honest and convincing impression, and 
should display the responses they want to show. It may well be the case that, when 
attempting to control their behaviour, liars may exhibit 'overcontrol', that is, displaying a 
pattern of behaviour that will appear planned, rehearsed, and lacking in spontaneity (DePaulo 
& Kirkendol, 1989). 
 Another possible cue that may result from inadequate control of behaviour is that 
performances may look flat due to a lack of involvement (Burgoon & Buller, 1994; DePaulo 
et al., 2003). Charles Ingram, who was found guilty in the United Kingdom of cheating his 
way to the top prize in the popular TV quiz 'Who wants to be a Millionaire' might have 
experienced this. Staff working for the TV programme became suspicious when Ingram and 
his wife 'had not appeared as jubilant as the newly rich might' after winning the top prize of 
£1,000,000 (The Independent, 8 April 2003, page 9). This might have been due to a 
combination of fear of being caught out coupled with the awareness that their win was not 
legitimate. 
 Deception research has revealed evidence for all three processes. For example, 
compared to truth tellers, liars have a tendency to speak with a higher pitched voice (which 
might be the result of experienced arousal (emotion)); to include fewer details into their 
accounts (which might be the result of content complexity); to make fewer illustrators (hand 
and arm movements designed to modify and/or supplement what is being said verbally), and 
to make fewer hand and finger movements (non-functional movements of hands and fingers 
without moving the arms) which might be the result of either content complexity or 
attempted control. 
 Perhaps a striking finding in deception research is that clear cues of nervous 
behaviour, such as gaze aversion and fidgeting, do not appear to be related to deception. This 
is striking because, as I will address later on, people, including professional lie catchers, 
strongly believe that liars display such cues of nervousness. However, the lack of such 
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behaviours might be the result of the artificial nature of deception studies, which have almost 
exclusively been conducted in university laboratories where participants (mostly college 
students) tell the truth or lie for the sake of the experiment. In those situations the stakes are 
typically low. Participants might receive a nominal financial reward when they lie 
convincingly but this does not really reflect the vast gains someone might win for lying in 
some real life situations. A form of punishment (negative consequences) if the liar is caught 
out is nearly always absent in laboratory studies both for practical3 and ethical reasons. In 
real life liars sometimes face severe negative consequences when they are caught out. Most 
lies people tell in daily life are low-stakes lies (DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 
1996) and deception studies perhaps quite accurately reflect how people respond in such 
situations. However, sometimes the stakes are high for liars (and truth tellers), such as in 
police interviews. It might well be that liars (and truth tellers) behave differently in such 
situations. Police officers typically believe that guilty suspects will be afraid of getting 
caught (Inbau et al., 2001), and, if this is true, nervous behaviours might well occur when 
suspects lie during their police interviews.  
 Studies examining suspects' behaviour are rare because of three difficulties 
researchers face. It is not easy for them to get hold of videotaped police interviews. 
Moreover, it is difficult to establish the ground truth in such interviews, that is, to establish 
with absolute certainty when the suspect is lying and when the suspect is telling the truth. 
Finally, in order to make valid comparisons between suspects' lies and truths, videoclips of 
lies and truths need to be selected which are truly comparable. Selecting so-called 
comparable truths (Vrij, 2002b) is difficult as I will explain later. In a recent study, we 
(Mann, Vrij, &, Bull, 2002) overcame these difficulties and examined the behaviour 
displayed by 16 suspects during their police interviews. The suspects were all being 
interviewed in connection with serious crimes such as murder, rape and arson, and all 
interviews were videotaped. Regarding the ground truth, clips of video footage were selected 
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where other sources (reliable witness statements and forensic evidence) provided evidence 
that the suspect lied or told the truth. In addition, for each suspect, truths and lies were 
chosen which were as comparable as possible in nature. For example, a suspect who gave a 
detailed description about how he had assisted in killing a person (truth), later denied any 
involvement in the crime (lie). Results revealed that like the participants in numerous 
laboratory studies, the suspects in these high-stakes situations did not show clear 
stereotypical nervous behaviours such as gaze aversion and fidgeting either. In fact, they 
exhibited an increase in pauses and (male suspects displayed) a decrease in hand and arm 
movements. These behaviours are more in line with the content complexity and attempted 
control approaches than with the emotional approach. The strongest evidence that content 
complexity affected suspects' behaviour more than nervousness was the finding regarding eye 
blinks. Suspects made fewer eye blinks when they lied. Research has shown that nervousness 
results in an increase in eye blinking (Harrigan & O'Connell, 1996), whereas increased 
cognitive load results in a decrease in eye blinking (Wallbott & Scherer, 1991).  
 The apparent predominance of cognitive load processes compared to emotional 
processes in our suspect interviews is perhaps not surprising. Many suspects in serious cases 
have had a history of regular contact with the police. Therefore, they are probably familiar 
with police interviews which might somewhat decrease their nervousness. However, suspects 
in police interviews are often less intelligent than the average person (Gudjonsson, 2003). 
There is evidence that less intelligent people will have particular difficulty in inventing 
plausible and convincing stories (Ekman & Frank, 1993).  
2. Subtle differences. Differences in behaviour between liars and truth tellers are usually very 
small (Vrij, 1994) and, obviously, the smaller the differences, the more difficult it will be to 
detect them. However, cues to deception may be more likely to occur when the three 
processes which might elicit verbal and behavioural responses to deceit (emotions, cognitive 
complexity, and attempted behavioural control) become more profound. Indeed, in a series of 
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laboratory experiments where the stakes were manipulated (although the stakes were never 
really high), it was found that high-stakes lies were easier to detect than low-stakes lies 
(DePaulo, Kirkendol, Tang, & O'Brien, 1988; DePaulo, Lanier, & Davis, 1983; DePaulo, 
LeMay, & Epstein, 1991; DePaulo, Stone, & Lassiter, 1985b; Lane & DePaulo, 1999; Vrij, 
2000b; Vrij, Harden, Terry, Edward, & Bull, 2001), and that motivated liars (liars who really 
tried to avoid getting caught) were easier to catch than unmotivated liars (DePaulo, Blank, 
Swaim, & Hairfield, 1992). 
3. The use of heuristics. Rather than actively scrutinising another's reactions for cues to 
deceit, observers may instead rely on 'rule of thumb' decision rules which are often called 
cognitive heuristics (Levine, Park, & McCornack, 1999). Person perception researchers have 
emphasised that this is the most effective way that observers with limited time and attentional 
resources deal with complex environments (Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2001). However, such 
heuristics easily lead to systematic errors and biases. Levine et al. (1999) refer to several 
heuristics which are thought to influence veracity judgements, including the probing heuristic 
and the representativeness heuristic. The probing heuristic (Levine & McCornack, 2001) 
refers to judges' tendency to believe a source more after the source has been probed. 
(Receivers have a strong belief in the efficacy of probing as a lie detection strategy. In case 
probing does not result in clear signs of deceit, and it often will not (Levine & McCornack, 
2001), the source is more likely to be believed.) The representativeness heuristic (Stiff, 
Miller, Sleight, Mongeau, Garlick, & Rogan (1989) refers to the tendency to evaluate a 
particular reaction as an example of a broader category. Used in a deception context it could 
explain people's inclination to interpret nervous behaviours as signs of deceptive behaviour.  
 O'Sullivan (2003) demonstrated that the Fundamental Attribution Error (FAE) 
undermines lie detection. The FAE is the tendency, when forming impressions of others, to 
overestimate dispositional factors of that person and to underestimate situational factors. 
Therefore, when an observer believes that someone is generally a trustworthy person, s/he 
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will have the tendency to judge that person as truthful in any given situation. Similarly, when 
the observer believes that someone is an untrustworthy person, s/he will be inclined to judge 
that person as dishonest in any given situation.  
 Even more, as yet unlabelled, heuristics might be present in veracity judgements. For 
example, observers have a tendency to judge reactions which are odd or infrequent (e.g., 
keeping the eyes closed during a conversation, staring during the conversation, etc.) as 
deceptive (Bond, Omar, Pitre, Lashley, Skaggs, & Kirk, 1992). Since Bond et al. (1992) used 
expectancy violation as a theoretical model for this finding, I would like to call this heuristic 
the 'expectancy-violation heuristic'. Finally, people with attractive faces are typically thought 
of as more honest (Aune, Levine, Ching, & Yoshimoto, 1993; Bull, in press; Bull & Rumsey, 
1988), so are individuals with a baby-faced appearance (Masip, Garrido, & Herrero, in press, 
a, b), an heuristic which I would like to call the facial appearance heuristic. 
4. Violations of conversation rules. Social conversation rules may hamper lie detection. For 
example, in daily life conversations it is often seen as inappropriate or strange if the listener 
asks the other to elaborate on what s/he just said. As I will argue later, such a tactic might 
help lie detectors. Also, conversation rules determine that a listener looks the speaker in the 
eye, yet the eyes don't reveal reliable information about deception. As I will point out later, it 
would benefit the listener if s/he looked at the speaker's body movements or closed his/her 
eyes and just listened to the speaker when attempting to detect deceit, but this would be 
viewed as inappropriate in daily life conversations. 
5. The wrong cues. There are widespread, but often incorrect, beliefs about how people 
respond when they lie. Studies investigating how people think liars respond have revealed 
that observers (both laypersons and professional lie catchers) overwhelmingly expect liars to 
react nervously, with 'liars look away' and 'liars make grooming gestures' being the most 
popular beliefs (Akehurst, Köhnken, Vrij, & Bull, 1996; Lakhani & Taylor, 2003; Mann et 
al., 2004; Strömwall & Granhag, 2003; Taylor & Vrij, 2000; Vrij & Semin, 1996; Vrij & 
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Taylor, 2003). For example, 75% of police officers believe that liars look away4 (Mann et al., 
2004; Vrij & Semin, 1996), and make grooming gestures (Vrij & Semin, 1996). These 
findings are not surprising given the fact that police manuals typically promote the idea that 
liars look away and fidget (Gordon, Fleisher, & Weinberg, 2002; Hess, 1997; Inbau et al., 
2001; Yeschke, 1997; Zulawski & Wicklander, 1993). However, as already mentioned, 
empirical evidence to support this view is lacking. It is therefore not surprising that in our lie 
detection study where we showed police officers videoclips of suspects who lied or told the 
truth during their police interviews (Mann et al., 2004), we found that the more the police 
officers endorsed the 'lie cues' promoted in police manuals, the worse they became at 
distinguishing between suspects' truths and lies. In other words, applying the information 
provided in those manuals appears to be counterproductive.  
 Apart from being taught the wrong cues, there is another reason why people typically 
expect nervous reactions: They believe that they show such reactions themselves when they 
lie. In two studies we investigated participants' behaviour while lying and truth telling, and 
also asked the participants afterwards to indicate what behaviour they thought they had 
exhibited when they lied and when they were telling the truth (Vrij, Edward, & Bull, 
2001a; Vrij, Semin, & Bull, 1996). Results showed that participants had poor insight into 
their own behaviour and thought that they responded more stereotypically while lying 
(showing increased gaze aversion, an increase in movements, and so on) than they in fact did. 
For example, participants actually showed a reduction in movements. In other words, it 
seems that during lie detection observers look for cues they mistakenly believe they 
themselves show while lying. 
6. Overemphasis on nonverbal cues. Another reason why I think people are typically poor lie 
detectors is that they don't seem to take speech content enough into account. Observers do 
listen to the speech content, but mainly in situations where they are knowledgeable about the 
topic. In that case observers can easily compare their knowledge of facts with what the 
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speaker says. In one real life case (the Independent, 20 July 2001, page 3) Jeffrey Archer, a 
former British politician later convicted for perjury, asked three journalists to leave his hotel 
room during a political party conference while he took a call from the Prime Minister. 
Another politician who saw the three journalists pacing up and down the corridor asked them 
what they were doing. He immediately realised that Archer had lied to the journalists and 
could not be speaking to the Prime Minister on the phone, because he knew that the Prime 
Minister was sitting on the conference platform at that very moment. In another real life case 
(Vrij & Mann, 2001), police officers asked a man who was suspected of murder about his 
whereabouts on a certain afternoon. The man explained in detail that he visited a market in a 
village near his home. The police detectives knew that this was a lie because, apparently 
unknown to the suspect, the market had been cancelled on that particular day. In both 
examples lie detectors could discover that the person is lying by comparing what they know 
with what the target person says. Moreover, when police officers hear different statements 
from the same person about a topic, or different statements from different people about a 
topic, they also tend to focus primarily on speech content, checking for consistency between 
the different statements (Granhag & Strömwall, 1999, 2000, 2001a, b; Strömwall, Granhag, 
& Jonsson, 2003).5 
 However, there is evidence that in situations where there is no information to check 
and only one statement is made, people, including police officers, primarily pay attention to 
nonverbal communication in order to form an impression (Greuel, 1992; Mehrabian, 1972; 
Mehrabian & Ferris, 1967; Mehrabian & Wiener, 1967; Rozelle & Baxter, 1975; Vrij, 
Foppes, Volger, & Winkel, 1992; Walkley, 1985; Waltman, 1983). Meissner and Kassin 
(2002) pointed out that in Florida, Tom Sawyer, believed to be innocent but accused of 
sexual assault and murder, became a prime suspect because he appeared embarrassed and his 
face flushed during an initial interview (see Ofshe, 1989, for a detailed description of the 
Tom Sawyer case). According to Kaufmann, Drevland, Wessel, Overskeid, and Magnussen 
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(2003) judicial decisions are sometimes based on nonverbal communication, even when 
available evidence points in the other direction. They describe a Norwegian court trial in 
which, in their words (p. 22): "although the circumstantial evidence of guilt was strong, the 
defendant (a financial adviser) was acquitted partly because.....his nonverbal behavior was 
confident without evasive eye movements of any sort". 
 There are several reasons why in the latter circumstances people rely so much on 
nonverbal behaviour. First, it might be more noticeable than speech (DePaulo & Kirkendol, 
1989; Vrij, 2000a). For example, there are automatic links between strongly felt emotions 
and certain behaviours (Ekman, 1985/2001), whereas there are not such strong links between 
emotions and speech content. Anger, for example, results in several cues, including 
narrowing of the lips. This might well give a lie away if an angry person denies being angry. 
 Second, there is sometimes little speech content to rely upon because the suspect just 
says a few words or just a couple of sentences. In such situations an observer has almost no 
choice than to make a judgement based on someone's behaviour. 
  Third, professional lie catchers may not know which verbal cues to pay attention to 
even when the target person speaks substantially. They may not know this because police 
manuals do not pay much attention to verbal aspects of speech, or in the few cases where 
they do mention verbal cues, they do not focus on the cues which research has indicated are 
(to some extent) diagnostic for deception (Vrij, 2000a; in press, a). Finally, influential 
researchers in the deception field, such as Ekman (1985/2001), don't put much emphasis on 
speech content either.6 However, speech content can reveal deception if observers pay 
attention to the diagnostic cues (Vrij, 2000a; in press, a).  
7. People do not take individual differences into account. There are large individual 
differences in people's speech, behaviour and physiological responses. Some people typically 
make many movements, whilst others do not; some people are very talkative, others are not, 
etc.. Another reason why people fail to catch liars is that they do not take such individual 
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differences into account when they attempt to detect deceit. Those people whose natural 
behaviour looks suspicious are in a particularly disadvantageous position. Some individuals' 
nonverbal behaviour gives the impression that they are telling the truth (honest demeanour 
bias), whereas others' natural behaviour leaves the impression that they are lying (dishonest 
demeanour bias) (Riggio, Tucker, & Throckmorton, 1988; Riggio, Tucker, & Widaman, 
1987; Vrij, 1993; Vrij & Van Wijngaarden, 1994; Vrij & Winkel, 1992b; Zuckerman, 
DeFrank, Hall, Larrance, & Rosenthal, 1979). Demeanour biases are related to personality 
traits. Expressive people, for example, exude credibility, regardless of the truth of their 
assertions. It is not that they are particularly skilled at lying, but their spontaneity tends to 
disarm suspicion, which makes it easier for them to get away with their lies (Riggio, 1986). 
On the other hand, people with a strong sense of public self-consciousness tend to make a 
less credible impression on others, regardless of whether they are telling the truth. When 
these individuals lie they are concerned about being scrutinised by others, which changes 
their behaviour in such a way that it appears dishonest. Introverts and socially anxious people 
also impress others as being less credible. The social clumsiness of introverts and the 
impression of tension, nervousness or fear that is given off naturally by socially anxious 
individuals is interpreted by observers as indicators of deception. Interestingly, their 
demeanour seems not to accurately reflect their behaviour. For example, introverted people 
lie infrequently (Kashy & DePaulo, 1996). Introverts also commit fewer crimes than 
extraverts (Eysenck, 1984). Furthermore, socially anxious people are less likely to persist in 
lying when challenged (Vrij & Holland, 1998). 
 Errors in interpreting someone's behaviour easily arise in cross-cultural interactions 
due to differences in behaviour displayed by different ethnic groups. Afro-American people 
generally display more gaze aversion than white American people (LaFrance & Mayo, 1976), 
and people originating from Turkey and Morocco who are living in the Netherlands show 
more gaze aversion than native Dutch people (Vrij, 2000a; Vrij, Dragt, & Koppelaar, 1992). 
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Such differences are, in part, caused by the fact that gaze patterns are influenced by culture, 
and that looking into the eyes of a conversation partner is regarded as polite in Western 
cultures but is considered to be rude in several other cultures (Vrij & Winkel, 1991; Vrij, 
Winkel, & Koppelaar, 1991). 
 Also, compared to Caucasian Dutch citizens, Dutch citizens originating from 
Surinam, show more gaze aversion, make more speech disturbances (speech fillers such as 
'ah', 'um', 'er' and stutters), smile more often, and make more self manipulations (scratching 
the head, wrists, and so on) and illustrators (hand and arm movements designed to modify 
and/or supplement what is being said verbally) (Vrij & Winkel, 1991). These behaviours 
show an overlap with the behaviours that Western white people associate with deception 
(Akehurst et al., 1996; Strömwall & Granhag, 2003; Taylor & Vrij, 2000; Vrij & Semin, 
1996; Vrij & Taylor, 2003). Indeed, several experimental studies which we conducted in the 
Netherlands have revealed that behaviours that are typically displayed by members of some 
ethnic groups living in the Netherlands make a suspicious impression on Caucasian Dutch 
police officers, a phenomenon which we labelled cross-cultural nonverbal communication 
errors (Vrij & Winkel, 1992a, 1994; Vrij et al., 1991, 1992). That is, nonverbal behavioural 
patterns that are normal and natural for certain ethnic groups may be interpreted by 
Caucasian observers as revealing attempts to hide the truth. 
8. People do not take situational differences into account. Not only do different people 
behave differently in the same situation (interpersonal differences), the same person also 
behaves differently in different situations (intrapersonal differences). Neglecting those 
intrapersonal differences is another error that lie catchers make. Police officers are advised to 
examine a suspect's natural, truthful, behaviour during the small-talk part at the beginning of 
the interview and to compare this behaviour with the behaviour shown by the suspect during 
the actual interview (Inbau et al., 2001). Differences in behaviour could then be interpreted as 
signs of deceit. Moston and Engelberg (1993) noticed that this is a technique commonly 
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employed in police interviews in England and Wales. Unfortunately, this approach is prone 
to incorrect judgements because an incongruent comparison is made. Small-talk and the 
actual investigation are fundamentally different situations. Small-talk conversations are low-
stakes situations where the suspect's responses are unlikely to have any negative 
consequences. The investigative part of the interview, on the other hand, is a high-stakes 
situation where the suspect's responses are intensely scrutinised and where the suspect's 
reactions may easily heighten suspicion. Suspects are probably aware of this and therefore, 
not surprisingly, both guilty and innocent people tend to show different behaviours during 
small-talk compared to the actual interview (Vrij, 1995). Some researchers make the same 
mistake. In a rare example of a real life high-stakes deception study, Hirsch and Wolf (2001) 
observed 23 nonverbal and verbal cues displayed by ex-President Clinton during his Grand 
Jury Testimony in the Monica Lewinsky case. They examined a 23-minute segment of the 
videotape and compared this with 11 minutes of the same testimony when he answered basic 
questions (his name, his attorney's name, etc.). Significant differences were obtained for 19 
cues. They also compared the 23-minute segment with 5 minutes of a fundraising speech to a 
sympathetic crowd. This time, 20 significant differences emerged. Unfortunately, this study 
tells us nothing about cues to deception. The comparisons between this 23-minute fragment 
and the other fragments are apple and orange comparisons. It is obvious that a person will 
show different behaviours when answering basic questions or when addressing a crowd in a 
fundraising speech compared to when interviewed about an alleged affair. In this respect, it 
might be more surprising that significant differences were found for only 19 or 20 cues and 
not for all 23 cues. In summary, for lie detection it is necessary that so-called comparable 
truths (Vrij, 2002b) are selected and compared with potentially deceptive parts of the 
interview. 
9. Individual differences in lie detection skills. Research has demonstrated individual 
differences in lie detection ability, with some people being better than others. For example, in 
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Mann et al.'s (2004) study the total accuracy rates for individual officers varied from a low 
30% to a very high 90% (achieved by three officers, Mann, 2001).  
 It is not easy to explain these individual differences. The ability to detect lies is not 
correlated with gender and age (Ekman & O'Sullivan 1991; Porter, Woodworth, & Birt, 
2000; Vrij & Mann, 2001) or with lie detectors' confidence in the accuracy of their own 
veracity judgements (see DePaulo, Charlton, Cooper, Lindsay, & Muhlenbruck, 1997, for a 
meta-analysis). However, some findings are more promising. O'Sullivan (2003) found that 
good lie detectors were somewhat less vulnerable to the fundamental attribution error 
(discussed above) than poor lie detectors. Mann et al. (2004) found a positive relationship 
between officers' self-reported experience in interviewing suspects and their ability to detect 
truths and lies. This finding has not been obtained in previous deception studies with 
professionals as observers (DePaulo & Pfeifer, 1986; Ekman & O'Sullivan, 1991; Porter et 
al., 2000). I believe that this is the result of how experience was measured. Other researchers, 
for example Ekman and O'Sullivan (1991), used 'years of job experience' as a measurement 
for experience. Unfortunately, they did not further define 'job experience'. It might well be 
that this measurement reveals little because it does not specifically relate to the amount of 
experience the officer has had in a relevant situation where they will attempt to detect deceit 
such as during interviews with suspects. There is little reason to suggest that a police officer 
who has worked for many years in a managerial or administrative position within the police 
force would have any more experience than, and hence be a better lie detector than, someone 
with a similar position outside the police force. Therefore perhaps unsurprisingly, Mann et al. 
(2004) also did not find a significant correlation either between general job experience (i.e. 
'years of service') and accuracy. In other words, experience might benefit truth and lie 
detection, if only the relevant experience is taken into account. 
 In several lie detection studies the relationship between the cues people claim to pay 
attention to when attempting to detect deceit and their ability to distinguish between truths 
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and lies was examined. In our own studies (Mann et al., 2004; Vrij & Mann, 2001) we found 
that participants (police officers in both studies) who mentioned gaze aversion and fidgeting 
as cues to deceit achieved the lowest accuracy scores. When other researchers examined such 
relationships different findings emerged. For example, Ekman and O'Sullivan (1991) found 
that participants who mentioned both speech cues and nonverbal cues obtained higher total 
accuracy scores than those who mentioned only speech cues or only nonverbal cues. 
Anderson, DePaulo, Ansfield, Tickle, and Green's (1999) and Feeley and Young (2000) 
found that the more vocal cues (speech errors, speech fillers, pauses, voice) participants 
mentioned, the higher total accuracy they obtained. Porter et al. (2000) found no significant 
relationships between cues mentioned and total accuracy. Frank and Ekman (1997) reported 
that good lie detectors were better at spotting brief facial expressions of emotion than poor lie 
detectors. Such micro expressions have not been investigated in any of the other studies 
discussed here. 
 In summary, different studies reveal different outcomes, and as a result of this, a clear 
picture of what distinguishes a good from a poor lie detector has yet to emerge. There are at 
least four explanations for this lack of consistency. One explanation is that the relationships 
between cues mentioned and accuracy are generally weak: The correlations researchers 
report usually fall into the r= .20 to r = .30 range. Another explanation is that in different 
studies participants faced different lie detection situations, and therefore comparisons are 
difficult to make. For example, in most studies participants were requested to detect truths 
and lies in low-stakes situations, whereas in some studies participants were exposed to 
higher-stakes situations. Interestingly, in both our experiments (Mann et al., 2004; Vrij & 
Mann, 2001) participants were requested to detect truths and lies told during police 
interviews and both studies obtained similar findings. Thirdly, perhaps lie detectors are not 
aware of what they pay attention to, and so lie detection could just be an intuitive skill. We 
(Mann et al., 2004) obtained some support for this assumption, as good lie detectors reported 
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relying significantly more often on 'gut feeling' than poor lie detectors. Finally, the weak 
relationships between cues mentioned and ability to detect deceit and the conflicting findings 
between different studies may be the result of a flaw in the experimental designs used in lie 
detection studies. In almost all lie detection studies published to date (but see Frank and 
Ekman, 1997, for an exception), people's skills to detect deceit were only tested once. The 
fact that they were good or bad at that particular task might have been a matter of luck, and 
there is certainly no guarantee that those lie detectors would achieve similar levels of 
accuracy if they were tested a second time. A better way of examining people's ability to 
detect deceit and the strategies good lie detectors use is to test the same people on several 
occasions, and to examine those lie detectors who give a consistent performance. Particular 
attention could then be paid to the cues mentioned by those who are consistently good. 
10. Existing interview techniques. Finally, several interview techniques promoted in police 
manuals hamper lie detection. For example, police detectives are sometimes advised to 
confront suspects with pieces of evidence they have already gathered early on in the 
interview (Inbau et al., 2001). This tactic is designed to show suspects that it is fruitless to 
remain silent and that it might be better for them to talk. This interview style will hamper lie 
detection. One of the difficulties for liars is that they do not know what the observer knows. 
They therefore do not know what they can say without running the risk of contradicting facts 
known to the observer. By disclosing to suspects the facts they know, police officers reduce 
the uncertainty for lying suspects and make lying easier for them. 
 Another unfortunate strategy from a lie detection perspective is if police detectives 
accuse suspects of lying (Inbau et al., 2001). This gives lying suspects the ideal opportunity 
to 'escape' from the interview situation. They might tell police detectives that they will no 
longer co-operate with the investigation, claiming that further interviewing is futile given the 
fact that the police detectives do not believe them (the suspect) anyway. Also, accusing 
someone might elicit the same responses in liars and truth tellers which then makes it 
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impossible to distinguish between them (Bond & Fahey, 1987; Ekman, 1985/2001). That is, 
when guilty suspects are accused of lying in a police interview they might become afraid of 
not being believed. However, innocent truthful suspects who are accused of lying might also 
become afraid of not being believed (Ofshe & Leo, 1997). Because of that fear, they may 
show the same nervous behaviours as liars (Bond & Fahey, 1987). This puts the lie detector 
in a difficult position: Should signs of fear be interpreted as signs of guilt or as signs of 
innocence? The behaviour doesn't provide the answer. Ekman (1985/2001) labelled this 
phenomenon the Othello error, after Shakespeare's play. Othello falsely accuses his wife, 
Desdemona, of infidelity. He tells her to confess since he is going to kill her for her 
treachery. Desdemona asks Cassio (her alleged lover) to be called so that he can testify her 
innocence. Othello tells her that he has already murdered Cassio. Realising that she cannot 
prove her innocence, Desdemona reacts with an emotional outburst, which Othello 
misinterprets as a sign of her infidelity. 
 How to Improve Lie detection Skills 
 Research regarding how to make people better lie detectors is relatively scarce, and 
the efficacy of several techniques which I will suggest in this section does still need to be 
tested in experimental research. 
1. Unravel the strategies of good lie detectors. Perhaps an obvious way of improving lie 
detection ability is searching for good lie detectors and unravelling the strategies they use. 
Perhaps this knowledge can be used to make others better lie detectors? Although this sounds 
straightforward, it is, in fact, hazardous. First, Ekman and his colleagues who are currently 
searching for good lie detectors have found only a very few exceptionally good lie detectors 
(O'Sullivan & Ekman, in press). Second, unravelling the strategies these good lie detectors 
use would not be easy either. Although good lie detectors could directly be asked which 
strategies they use, they probably would find this question difficult to answer, and (as 
discussed above) perhaps do not even know which strategy they use. Rather than asking them 
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which strategies they use directly, it could be discovered in an indirect way. For example, 
good lie detectors could be shown videotaped clips of liars and truth tellers and could be 
asked to indicate which fragments of behaviour within these clips they consider relevant to 
their decision making. Researchers could then carefully examine these fragments. However, 
it is not certain whether there will be consistency amongst good lie detectors in the fragments 
they select. Neither is it certain that such analyses will provide any meaningful (interpretable) 
information. Finally, these direct or indirect ways of unravelling lie detection strategies will 
not work if good lie detection is primarily an intuitive skill (which cannot be ruled out, as 
argued above). Obviously, if good lie detection is primarily based upon intuition, teaching 
others to become better lie detectors would become problematic. 
2. Encourage lie detectors to avoid paying attention to non-diagnostic cues. The finding that 
professional lie catchers have incorrect views about how liars respond suggest that they may 
become better lie detectors if they abolish these incorrect beliefs. Researchers have tried 
several methods to achieve this. In a first approach, lie detectors were given information 
about a few 'diagnostic cues', that is, information about some cues which the researchers 
believe are actually associated with deception (e.g., deTurck, Harszlak, Bodhorn, & Texter, 
1990). The problem of this method is that such cues (which will be the equivalent of 
Pinocchio's growing nose) do not exist. It is therefore unclear which cues need to be taught to 
the trainee lie detectors. A second approach is providing trainee lie detectors with outcome 
feedback ('correct' vs 'incorrect') regarding the truth/lie judgements they have made 
previously. On the basis of this information lie detectors could try to develop their own 
successful lie detection strategy. The benefit of such a method is that no misleading 
information about Pinocchio's growing nose is given. However, it is doubtful whether this 
'abstract' information is sufficient enough to make people better lie detectors. Reviews of 
'training studies' have indicated some, but only limited, success with both approaches (Frank 
& Feeley, 2003; Vrij, 2000a). 
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 More ways to eliminate incorrect beliefs are possible. For example, an observer could 
be instructed to pay attention to 'how the speakers are saying what they have to say' 
(DePaulo, Lassiter, & Stone, 1982), hereby subtly diverting the observers' attention away 
from misleading cues such as gaze aversion. Diverting attention can also be done in other 
ways. In various studies (see DePaulo, Stone, & Lassiter, 1985a, for an overview) the 
'channels' to which observers were exposed were manipulated. That is, some observers just 
heard an audiotape, other observers saw the full picture without sound. Another group of 
observers just saw people's head and shoulders, others just the body (without the head), etc.. 
Those studies have revealed that people become better lie detectors when they cannot see the 
person's face (DePaulo et al., 1985a; Wiseman, 1995). A possible explanation for this is that 
lie detectors are inclined to look at someone's eye movements when they are available to 
them, which is a misleading source of information. Those findings imply that observers could 
become better if they are instructed not to look at someone's face when they attempt to detect 
deceit.7 
 Yet another way to avoid looking at non-diagnostic verbal and non-verbal cues of 
deception is to negate the role of humans in lie detection and use computer-based verbal and 
non-verbal lie detection tools. Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC), a text analysis 
program that analyses written examples on a word-by-word basis, is such an example 
(Pennebaker, Francis, & Booth, 2001; Pennebaker & Graybeal, 2001). Newman, Pennebaker, 
Berry and Richards (2003) found that 67% of liars and truth tellers could correctly be 
classified with LIWC, whereas human lie detectors classified a significantly lower percentage 
(52%) of the same liars and truth tellers correctly. To my knowledge, computer-based non-
verbal analysis programmes are yet not available, but I know of academics in the United 
Kingdom who are working on such programmes and I expect such programmes to be 
available in the not so distant future. 
3. Implicit lie detection. Another way to improve lie detection skills is by encouraging people 
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to better use their already existing potential to distinguish between truths and lies. This can 
be achieved by asking people indirectly whether they think someone is lying (e.g., 'implicit 
lie detection', DePaulo, 1994; Vrij, 2001). An intriguing finding appeared in a meta-analysis 
of deception studies concerning confidence ratings (DePaulo et al., 1997). Regardless of 
whether observers judged a statement as truthful or deceptive, they had more confidence in 
their judgements when they had seen a truthful statement than when they had watched a 
deceptive statement. Apparently, something must go on in deceptive statements that 
observers notice. This is not enough to make them decide that the person is lying, but it is 
sufficient to make them insecure about the decision they make. It is their insecurity, rather 
than their veracity judgement, that provides valuable information about whether or not the 
statement was actually truthful. 
 In a different type of implicit lie detection study, nurses lied or told the truth about a 
staged event (Vrij, Edward, & Bull, 2001b). In an attempt to simulate what liars experience 
in police interviews, a situation was created where the task was more difficult for the liars 
than for the truth tellers, and, as a result of this, liars showed signs of cognitive load such as a 
decrease in hand and finger movements. The interviews were videotaped and shown to police 
officers. Some were asked whether each of the nurses was lying (explicit lie detection), 
others were asked to indicate for each nurse whether s/he 'had to think hard' (implicit lie 
detection, they were not informed that some nurses were actually lying). Police officers could 
distinguish between truths and lies, but only by using the implicit method. The findings 
further revealed that only officers using the indirect method paid attention to the cues which 
actually discriminated between truth tellers and liars on the videotape, such as a decrease in 
hand and finger movements. In other words, the instruction to look for cues of cognitive load 
directed the observers' attention to more diagnostic deception cues. See DePaulo (1994) and 
Vrij (2001) for overviews of implicit lie detection studies. 
4. Look at a combination of verbal and nonverbal cues. At present, verbal and nonverbal lie 
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detection are two separate entities, with researchers either looking at speech or looking at 
nonverbal behaviour. I believe that looking at a combination of speech and nonverbal 
behaviour will yield superior results. Our own research has consistently shown that more 
accurate truth/lie decisions can be made when both speech content and nonverbal behaviour 
are taken into account instead of just speech content or just nonverbal communication (Vrij, 
Edward, Roberts, & Bull, 2000; Vrij, Akehurst, Soukara, & Bull, 2004; Vrij & Mann, 2004). 
Porter and his colleagues also pointed out that looking at a combination of verbal and 
nonverbal cues has clear potential in deception detection (Porter & Yuille, 1995, 1996; 
Porter, Yuille, & Birt, 2001; Porter, Yuille, & Lehman, 1999). 
 A recent study gives an idea of how effective informing observers about a 
combination of verbal and nonverbal diagnostic cues to deception combined with an implicit 
lie detection method could be for lie detection purposes (Vrij, Evans, Akehurst, & Mann, in 
press). In a one hour training programme we taught observers (college students with no 
previous training in lie detection) how to make rapid (instant) assessments of the frequency 
of occurrence of twelve verbal and nonverbal cues which were found to be diagnostic cues to 
deception in literature reviews. The observers were also told how these cues were related to 
deception (that is, few hand and finger movements might be a sign of deceit, etc.). The 
observers were then shown videotaped clips of liars and truth tellers and were asked to 
estimate after each clip the frequency of occurrence of each of these taught diagnostic cues, 
and to write down these estimates (we hereby focused the observers' attention to these twelve 
cues). They were then asked to indicate whether or not the person in the clip was lying on the 
basis of their estimates (implicit lie detection). A total accuracy of 74% was found which is 
considerably higher than the 57% typically found in lie detection research with laypersons as 
judges (Vrij, 2000a).8 
5. Comparable truths. Lie detectors could be taught how to establish comparable truths and 
how to compare the response under investigation with the response during this comparable 
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truth. To give an example, during a videotaped real-life police interview a man suspected 
(and later convicted) of murder was asked to describe his activities on a particular day (Vrij 
& Mann, 2001). The murder suspect described his activities during the morning, afternoon 
and evening. Detailed analyses of the videotape revealed a sudden change in behaviour as 
soon as he started to describe his activities during the afternoon and evening. One possible 
reason for this may have been that he was lying. Evidence supported this view. Police 
investigations could confirm his story with regard to his morning activities, but revealed that 
his statement about the afternoon and evening was fabricated. In reality, he met the victim in 
the afternoon and killed her later on that day. In this case, we were able to make a good 
comparison. There are no good reasons why different behaviours would emerge while 
describing different parts of the day, especially when describing such a seemingly normal day 
as the suspect did. When such differences do emerge, they are remarkable and worth 
investigating. Interestingly, the question on which we based the baseline method "What did 
you do that particular day?" could be asked in many interviews. 
6. Interviewing to detect deception. An alternative way of pursuing improvement in lie 
detection skills is by introducing specific interview styles. At the core of this approach is 
whether certain interview styles may facilitate lie detection. Unfortunately, very little is 
known about this, because a systematic examination of the efficacy of interview styles has 
attracted virtually no attention from researchers to date. In an attempt to fill this gap, we are 
currently conducting a series of experiments9 exploring this issue.  
 In an initial study, I tested the potential of a challenging information-gathering 
interview style versus an accusatory interview style in lie detection (Vrij, 2004). Thirty-six 
truth tellers and liars (college students), who were all promised a reward if they could tell a 
convincing story, were interviewed in three different ways: The interview started with an 
information-gathering interview-style (e.g., "Please tell me in as much detail as possible what 
happened in that room just now", Phase 1), which then developed into an accusation (e.g., 
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"Just admit that you tried to fool me", Phase 2), and finally transformed back into an 
information-gathering interview style (e.g., "Please tell me again in as much detail as 
possible what happened when you were in that room just now", Phase 3). All interviews were 
videotaped and the behaviours of the participants were scored in detail. The most prominent 
differences between liars and truth tellers were expected in Phase 3. The main difference 
between Phases 1 and 3 was, that in Phase 3 the participants knew that they ran a serious risk 
of not being believed, and that this would mean that they would not be given the reward. This 
probably would make them more motivated in Phase 3 than in Phase 1 to tell a convincing 
story, and as mentioned earlier, motivated liars show more signs of deceit than unmotivated 
liars. Although the participants were probably also motivated in Phase 2, they were accused 
of not telling the truth in that phase. As mentioned above, an accusation per se will affect 
people's behaviour (compare Othello's example) and this 'accusation effect' (e.g., the effect an 
accusation has on behavioural responses) might well overshadow the 'deception effect' (e.g., 
the effect lying has on behavioural responses). The results supported the hypothesis and the 
most prominent differences between liars and truth tellers were obtained in Phase 3. 
 Creating a difficult situation for interviewees could be another potentially effective 
interview technique. As discussed above, one reason why liars give away cues of deceit is 
because they find it difficult to lie. Obviously, creating a difficult situation will affect both 
liars and truth tellers, however, if liars already find lying difficult it may well affect them 
more than truth tellers, resulting in more prominent differences between liars and truth 
tellers, and subsequently more opportunities for lie detectors to distinguish between the two. 
 One way of increasing difficulty in interviews is providing the evidence the lie 
detector has at a late stage in the interview. In a recent study (Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall 
& Vrij, 2004) participants told the truth or lied about a staged theft in a shop. Both liars and 
truth tellers were encouraged to tell their stories in detail. The interviewer, who had some 
limited knowledge about what had happened in the shop, presented this knowledge to some 
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participants at a relatively early stage of the interview, and to other participants at a relatively 
late stage. Preliminary results indicate that lie detection was easier when the evidence was 
presented at a later stage. Perhaps, in that situation the liar had already reported his or her 
fabrication in detail and it therefore became more difficult for them to incorporate the facts 
the lie detector provided in their fabricated stories in a plausible and convincing way. 
 Another way of making an interview situation more challenging is by inviting 
interviewees to elaborate on what they just have said. This might well be difficult, 
particularly for liars. Liars might have prepared themselves about what they are going to say, 
but are unlikely to have prepared the amount of details which are required in extensive 
elaboration requests. They then face a dilemma. They could make things up spontaneously, 
but this is sometimes difficult. Alternatively, they could say that they do not remember 
anything else anymore. The latter strategy might look suspicious in case they have given a 
detailed account in their original answer. People rarely spontaneously recall all details they 
know. Therefore, providing lots of details initially followed by a total silence will look 
suspicious. A good strategy for liars is to fabricate a story which is in fact true, but which 
happened at another time than the liar claims. For example, a guilty suspect who denies 
involvement in the crime under investigation could claim that he was at the gym at the 
particularly time the crime took place. If he has been to that particular gym before he now 
can truthfully describe an experience at the gym. The only fabricated part in this story is 
when he was there. Lying about the time makes the liar vulnerable in further questioning. The 
interviewer could ask questions which are specifically related to the particular time the 
interviewee claims to have been at the gym. For example, the interviewer could ask which 
instructor was present at that particular time.10  
 Lie detectors also might make the interview situation more difficult by asking 
interviewees to repeat what they have said before. Liars are sometimes caught because they 
forgot what they previously said, they may even forget central elements of their previous 
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story. Checking interviewees' memory for these central elements might therefore be a good 
lie detection strategy.  
 Yet another way of further challenging interviewees is by asking them to recall what 
happened in a non-chronological time order, for example in reverse order (i.e., beginning to 
tell what happened at the end of the event and then go back in time). Unlike truth tellers, liars 
tend to tell their stories in a strict chronological time order (Zaparniuk, Yuille, & Taylor, 
1995), and diverting from this order may well be too difficult for them to do.  
 Conclusion 
 I started this article by reporting research evidence regarding professional lie catchers' 
ability to detect deceit. I then gave numerous reasons why they make errors in their veracity 
judgements. I also argued that they may become better lie detectors if they avoid certain 
pitfalls and use some alternative interview techniques. Unfortunately, the efficacy of most of 
these interview styles has not yet been tested in experimental research. Such research is 
highly desirable, as I believe that developing efficient interview styles is the most promising 
way of making professionals better lie detectors. I hope that this article will encourage 
academics and practitioners to conduct such important research. 
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 Footnotes  
1. An important reason why lies remain undetected is that observers do not want to know the truth, 
because it is not in their best interests. We labelled this phenomenon the Ostrich effect (Vrij & Mann, 
2003). People generally appreciate the compliments made by others about their body shape, their 
hairstyle, the way they are dressed, their achievements, and so on. So why bother trying to discover 
whether those compliments are spoken in truth? More serious lies may also remain undiscovered for 
this same reason (Ekman, 1996; Vrij, 2000a). I don't address the Ostrich effect in this article because 
professional lie catchers are probably motivated to catch liars and hence it does not really apply to them. 
2. Those three factors are derived from Zuckerman, DePaulo, & Rosenthal's (1981) four factor model. In 
addition to the three factors mentioned in the main text, they included a fourth factor in their theoretical 
model, labelled 'arousal'. I left this factor out because, as Zuckerman et al. (1981) themselves 
acknowledge, it shows an overlap with the emotion factor. There are alternative theoretical explanations 
as to why liars and truth tellers sometimes respond differently. See DePaulo et al. (2003) for an overview 
of these theoretical considerations. 
3. Participants can be told that they have to conduct an unpleasant task if they are caught out. However, 
clever participants will realise that researchers cannot apply these threats as participants are informed at 
the beginning of the experiment that they can withdraw from the study at any time. 
4. Sometimes professional lie catchers tell me that they believe that eye movements are associated with 
deception. They then typically refer to the neurolinguistic programming (NLP) model. However, not a 
single scientific study has demonstrated that eye movements are related to deception in the way 
described in the NLP model (Vrij & Lochun, 1997). NLP teachers who claim the opposite therefore are 
engaged in deceiving their pupils. 
5. Hence, police officers believe that there is a relationship between consistency and veracity (Akehurst 
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et al., 1996; Granhag & Strömwall, 1999; Greuel, 1992; Strömwall & Granhag, 2003). More specifically, 
they believe that consistent statements are likely to be truthful and inconsistent statements are likely to 
be deceptive. However, the limited research in this area has shown that there is not such a link between 
consistency and veracity, and, if there is a link, it is more likely to be in the opposite direction. That is, 
Granhag, Strömwall and Reiman (2002) found that lying pairs (i.e. two people lying in collusion) were 
more consistent than truth telling pairs, and that single liars and single truth tellers were equally 
consistent over time. 
6. When the first edition of Ekman's Telling lies book appeared in 1985, not much systematic research 
into verbal cues to deception was published. However, this changed in the late eighties when Criteria-
Based Content Analysis was introduced (Köhnken & Steller, 1988; Steller & Köhnken, 1989, and see Vrij, 
in press a, for a review of CBCA research) and in the nineties, when the Reality Monitoring system was 
introduced (see Vrij, 2000a, and Masip, Sporer, Garrido, & Herrero, in press, for reviews of Reality 
Monitoring research). Unfortunately, Ekman does not substantially address CBCA and Reality 
Monitoring cues in his 2001 edition of his book. 
7. A possible argument against applying this technique is that micro facial expressions of emotions 
which may reveal deceit (Ekman, 1985/2001) will remain unnoticed. However, they are only likely to 
occur when emotions are strongly and suddenly felt (Ekman, 1985/2001). Since most people do not feel 
strong emotions when they lie (DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 1996), most lies in daily 
life would remain unnoticed when lie detectors rely solely upon micro expressions of emotions. It is 
unknown how frequently such expressions occur in high-stakes situations such as police interviews. 
8. This study differed in three aspects from traditional studies in which information about diagnostic 
cues is given. First, information about both nonverbal and verbal cues was given rather than 
information about either nonverbal cues or verbal cues. Second, information about twelve cues was 
  




provided rather than information about just one cue or a few cues. The latter method is misleading as it 
gives the impression that Pinocchio's growing nose exist. Third, an implicit lie detection method rather 
than an explicit lie detection method was used. Although not tested, I believe that the three aspects 
combined have contributed to the high accuracy scores in this study. 
9. Funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (grant RES-000-23-0292). 
10. I am grateful to Ron Fisher for this suggestion. 
